This is a philosophical question that has ultimately proven difficult to answer. I believe this is a result of the complexity of consensus theory. For a theory that places great emphasis on autonomy and freedom, the most obvious basis for legitimate political authority should be some form of voluntary, self-assumed obligation. However, some philosophers such as John Locke and Charles Beitz argue that tacit consent can ground the obligation to obey the law of the state while others such as Hanna Pitkin and David Hume counter this argument with the opinion that tacit consent is not sufficient to establish political obligation. Having an obligation simply means something that you are required to do for legal or moral reasons. Therefore, “Having a political obligation means having a moral duty to obey the laws of one's country or state.” Theoretically there are three types of consensus; Tacit, express, and hypothetical, and based on the principles of consent theories, I do not argue that consent explains our obligation to obey the law in the practical world. My reasons will be explained constructively throughout this essay. My goal in this article is to outline how the different ways of expressing consent are insufficient to explain our obligation to obey state law by interpreting and evaluating the defects of the types of consent. My aim is to demonstrate that theories of effective consent cannot be made to work, because there is no common basis for effective consent to obey the law. Although most people assume that their obligation to obey state laws is explained by a practical basis of their consent, I claim that if people morally agree with state laws, they obey them. Consensus theories do not necessarily explain why… at the heart of the paper… the voter's intention expressed by his vote renders his vote meaningless as a form of consensus. It could also be that the participants in the elections made false promises to citizens and therefore these “potential consenters” were misled. It cannot therefore be that voting for a supposedly legitimate government that acts contrary to what it has promised shows that, by voting, people are consenting to lies of which they know nothing. Again this is unrelated to John Simmons' conditions of making the potential consenter aware of what he is consenting to. CONCLUSION To conclude, I disagree that voting and staying in the country are plausible. They do not satisfy the conditions of the consensus theory. I believe that if the free choice of potential consents is missing, any possible explanation of the obligation to obey the law is missing.