You don't get hit, however, when the attack first occurs, it is easier to deal with it if all systems are the same. During the attack there was no clear leader and no one took responsibility, this shows how unprepared the NHS was before the attack. How does Wannacry work? Wannacry is a ransomware coupled with an exploit supposedly developed by the NSA (the United States National Security Agency). Ransomware is malware that is illegally installed on a computer or mobile device that disables its operation or access to its data until the owner or operator pays to regain control or access. The malware it was paired with was known as EternalBlue (code name), this malware targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. The attack only affected older, unsupported versions of Microsoft, which is why the NHS was so badly affected, and newer versions that had not been patched. Most of the computers affected by Wannacry in the NHS were not infected with phishing emails, these are emails sent with the intention of forcing the recipient to do what the sender wants (in this case open malware). But thanks to the EternalBlue exploit and the use of a backdoor malware called DoublePulsar, this backdoor provided a way to, once on a network, infect all computers physically connected to it, infect the computer and encrypt the data without the knowledge of the users. However, for malware to register on your network/computer, a phishing email must first be delivered and opened allowing the malware to propagate. Once on the network, it could take less than a minute to infect all the computers connected to it. The EternalBlue exploit was allegedly developed by the NSA and then disseminated. Microsoft has since placed the blame on the NSA, because they believe that if they had known about the flaw in their system sooner, they would have been able to release a patch much sooner. However, this would not have helped the national health service. 90% of NHS trusts were reportedly using at least one Windows XP device. This figure is incredibly important in explaining why the NHS was so badly affected by the Wannacry attack. Since Microsoft had released a patch for the flaw in their system that would prevent Wannacry from infecting their computers, but this was for supported Windows systems. Windows XP is not supported, so the NHS could not have dumped it to reduce the impact. When a computer is infected with WantCry, an application appears demanding a payment of £300-£600 to restore all files. Although the attack infected over 200,000 computers, Wannacry only earned about $72,000. Considering the scale of the attack, this revenue does not represent a huge amount of money. Furthermore, threat actors cannot access this money if they want their identity to remain anonymous, so in theory no money was made from the ransomware attack, the money was just lost. ImpactWannacry wasn't targeting the NHS, it simply found a huge flaw in their security. Wannacry had a huge global impact affecting large companies such as FedEx, Telefonica and other services, such as the transportation sector. In total Wannacry infected around 200,000 computers in 150 countries. The attack disrupted 34% of NHS trusts in England, or 80 of the 236 trusts in England. 34 of these trusts were directly infected by ransomware and could not access any files,while 46 were affected indirectly. The trusts indirectly affected were trusts that aimed not to acquire the malware, so they shut down computers and systems. This in turn has had an impact on patients, which is the focus of the NHS. An estimated 19,494 patients were affected by the attack. Affected patients had canceled appointments due to logistical constraints or because equipment running Windows XP was not working. They also had appointments rescheduled to new times or, if treatment was required, some patients had to travel to unaffected hospitals/CCGs in order to receive that treatment. It was reported that no NHS organization paid the ransom on the advice of senior figures in the government/security sector. However, with Wannacry encrypting patient data and blocking any access to computers, panic spread among hospitals. With employees working long hours to relieve the pressure/impact caused by Wannacry. It took up to 4 weeks after the initial infection for all traces of Wannacry to be removed from NHS systems. Prevention There are many ways in which the NHS could have helped to 'prevent' the attack. The Wannacry attack originated from the NSA, who informed Microsoft of the flaw in their system after it was released. This gave Microsoft the opportunity to patch the vulnerability. The patch was released on March 14 for all supported versions of Windows. However, because the NHS had so many systems running Windows XP which is not supported, it was not possible to download this patch. While the big problem for the NHS was the unsupported version of Windows, Windows XP, the NHS also had systems running supported versions of Windows but which had not been patched. Since the available patch was intended to remove the vulnerability, downloading this patch would have been crucial to preventing the drastic impact of the attack. A key prevention mechanism going forward would be to update all systems to supported versions of Windows if possible and apply patches regularly. This can significantly reduce the risk of exploits passing through NHS systems. To prevent the attack from being downloaded to a computer, a key and cost-effective way to help prevent attacks that do not propagate or even prevent malware from developing Wannacry on the computer, a key prevention. the method would be education. Training on which phishing emails and what looks suspicious could have been critical to preventing the severity of the attack. These phishing emails are believed to have been aimed at the financial sector within the NHS as the emails concerned invoices. Education and training are mandatory in the NHS, however training can always be improved. The NHS has not completely failed in terms of data security as all data has been backed up. The reason the NHS didn't have to pay any ransom was because all its data had been backed up. It's one of the best data defenses for any attack, but it can leave your backups and all your data vulnerable. Technical prevention methods include border defenses. These would be defenses such as inspecting emails for potential malware. This email security software can block emails if they meet certain criteria. These criteria include blocking emails if they come from: suspicious sources, if they have certain hash keys,.

Topic > You don't get hit, however, when the attack first occurs, it is easier to deal with it if all systems are the same. During the attack there was no clear leader and no one took responsibility, this shows how unprepared the NHS was before the attack. How does Wannacry work? Wannacry is a ransomware coupled with an exploit supposedly developed by the NSA (the United States National Security Agency). Ransomware is malware that is illegally installed on a computer or mobile device that disables its operation or access to its data until the owner or operator pays to regain control or access. The malware it was paired with was known as EternalBlue (code name), this malware targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. The attack only affected older, unsupported versions of Microsoft, which is why the NHS was so badly affected, and newer versions that had not been patched. Most of the computers affected by Wannacry in the NHS were not infected with phishing emails, these are emails sent with the intention of forcing the recipient to do what the sender wants (in this case open malware). But thanks to the EternalBlue exploit and the use of a backdoor malware called DoublePulsar, this backdoor provided a way to, once on a network, infect all computers physically connected to it, infect the computer and encrypt the data without the knowledge of the users. However, for malware to register on your network/computer, a phishing email must first be delivered and opened allowing the malware to propagate. Once on the network, it could take less than a minute to infect all the computers connected to it. The EternalBlue exploit was allegedly developed by the NSA and then disseminated. Microsoft has since placed the blame on the NSA, because they believe that if they had known about the flaw in their system sooner, they would have been able to release a patch much sooner. However, this would not have helped the national health service. 90% of NHS trusts were reportedly using at least one Windows XP device. This figure is incredibly important in explaining why the NHS was so badly affected by the Wannacry attack. Since Microsoft had released a patch for the flaw in their system that would prevent Wannacry from infecting their computers, but this was for supported Windows systems. Windows XP is not supported, so the NHS could not have dumped it to reduce the impact. When a computer is infected with WantCry, an application appears demanding a payment of £300-£600 to restore all files. Although the attack infected over 200,000 computers, Wannacry only earned about $72,000. Considering the scale of the attack, this revenue does not represent a huge amount of money. Furthermore, threat actors cannot access this money if they want their identity to remain anonymous, so in theory no money was made from the ransomware attack, the money was just lost. ImpactWannacry wasn't targeting the NHS, it simply found a huge flaw in their security. Wannacry had a huge global impact affecting large companies such as FedEx, Telefonica and other services, such as the transportation sector. In total Wannacry infected around 200,000 computers in 150 countries. The attack disrupted 34% of NHS trusts in England, or 80 of the 236 trusts in England. 34 of these trusts were directly infected by ransomware and could not access any files,while 46 were affected indirectly. The trusts indirectly affected were trusts that aimed not to acquire the malware, so they shut down computers and systems. This in turn has had an impact on patients, which is the focus of the NHS. An estimated 19,494 patients were affected by the attack. Affected patients had canceled appointments due to logistical constraints or because equipment running Windows XP was not working. They also had appointments rescheduled to new times or, if treatment was required, some patients had to travel to unaffected hospitals/CCGs in order to receive that treatment. It was reported that no NHS organization paid the ransom on the advice of senior figures in the government/security sector. However, with Wannacry encrypting patient data and blocking any access to computers, panic spread among hospitals. With employees working long hours to relieve the pressure/impact caused by Wannacry. It took up to 4 weeks after the initial infection for all traces of Wannacry to be removed from NHS systems. Prevention There are many ways in which the NHS could have helped to 'prevent' the attack. The Wannacry attack originated from the NSA, who informed Microsoft of the flaw in their system after it was released. This gave Microsoft the opportunity to patch the vulnerability. The patch was released on March 14 for all supported versions of Windows. However, because the NHS had so many systems running Windows XP which is not supported, it was not possible to download this patch. While the big problem for the NHS was the unsupported version of Windows, Windows XP, the NHS also had systems running supported versions of Windows but which had not been patched. Since the available patch was intended to remove the vulnerability, downloading this patch would have been crucial to preventing the drastic impact of the attack. A key prevention mechanism going forward would be to update all systems to supported versions of Windows if possible and apply patches regularly. This can significantly reduce the risk of exploits passing through NHS systems. To prevent the attack from being downloaded to a computer, a key and cost-effective way to help prevent attacks that do not propagate or even prevent malware from developing Wannacry on the computer, a key prevention. the method would be education. Training on which phishing emails and what looks suspicious could have been critical to preventing the severity of the attack. These phishing emails are believed to have been aimed at the financial sector within the NHS as the emails concerned invoices. Education and training are mandatory in the NHS, however training can always be improved. The NHS has not completely failed in terms of data security as all data has been backed up. The reason the NHS didn't have to pay any ransom was because all its data had been backed up. It's one of the best data defenses for any attack, but it can leave your backups and all your data vulnerable. Technical prevention methods include border defenses. These would be defenses such as inspecting emails for potential malware. This email security software can block emails if they meet certain criteria. These criteria include blocking emails if they come from: suspicious sources, if they have certain hash keys,.