Operation Anaconda is America's first major conflict with the enemy since Desert Storm and the largest battle of the 21st century. This operation was a joint effort between US service branches ranging from Army Special Forces and conventional forces to USAF and Navy for Fires support along with Afghan National Army (ANA) coalition forces , with the main push from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ).Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay The concept of Operation Anaconda is based on the Principles of Mission Command just like any other mission or approach when it comes to planning an operation of any size. According to the Army in ADP 6-0 it states: “Mission command requires competent forces, environmental mutual trust, and a shared understanding among commanders, staff, and subordinates. It requires effective teams and a command climate in which subordinates are required to seize opportunities and counter threats with the intent of the Commander.” The seven principles of mission command are: competence; mutual trust; shared understanding; commander's intent; mission order; disciplinary initiative; risk. Acceptance. Operation Anaconda was overall a failed mission, as per the CIA's intent which was to capture Osama Bin Laden before he was allowed to escape to neighboring Pakistan with the US counting eight KIA and 50 wounded in action and the mission planned for three days ended up being 17 days from March 2 to 18, 2002. The start of the mission was doomed to fail from the beginning because it did not follow the guidelines of the Principles of Mission Command. General Hagenbeck, division commander of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain DIV, had no command authority over TF Dagger, a U.S. Special Operation Force (SOF) team, over friendly Afghan forces and could only request close air support ( CAS) or high-level fire missions of the risk that your request will not be approved in time or rejected completely and all together. General Hagenbeck was unable to visualize and conceptualize his operation with his command staff because, he did not have overall command authority, he was at the mercy of the CIA and its agenda, as well as having too many top brass who did not understand the overall mission. , and finally not having the right people in its staff sections due to lack of time, staff and equipment. The United States had not learned from the previous failures of its domestic service branches when it came to joint operations. This failed operation led to the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which gave a single commander overall command and control of all US and NATO coalition forces in the global war on terrorism. He failed to capture Osama Bin Laden, the mastermind of the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City. Operation Anaconda failed because leaders failed to utilize the seven principles of mission command. To be successful in any operation/mission, leaders must be competent at their job, whether they are team leader up to division/coalition commander. They must know the inherited responsibilities in whatever role they are assigned, utilize all resources, personnel, information and knowledge to be a fully effective commander. General Hagenbeck lacked the concept with TF Dagger and the information he was given when it came to planning the operation. Top Brass didtoo much reliance on Predator ISR reconnaissance and had already made a decisive battle plan based solely on drone intelligence and had no secondary or tertiary battle plans. When SOF teams were sent to the Shah-I-Khot valley region to reaffirm information obtained from the drone footage, they were caught off guard due to the single overhead angle approaching RECON in 1 dimension. Reports were immediately sent to Higher about deficiencies and threats from the ground and were ignored, thus creating mistrust on the part of the SOF community and conventional forces. The current leadership failed to realize that the Russians had been defeated in the same region by the same fighters they were facing. Mistrust from SOF communities and conventional forces has eroded the second principle of mission command, mutual trust. Intentionally or not, General Hagenbeck and his staff created division in an already fractured command team. Mutual trust is stated in ADP 6-0: “Mutual trust is a shared trust among commanders, subordinates, and partners who can be relied upon and who are competent in carrying out assigned tasks.” Mutual trust is extremely essential to the success of Mission Command, it must be able to flow throughout the chain of command between subordinate units so that they can make independent decisions thus making them more lethal by exercising initiative on their own. This is clearly demonstrated throughout the entire process of planning and executing the entire Operation. An example shown in this article where SOF teams were sent to train Afghan forces who were accustomed to guerrilla tactics never performed structured maneuvers. This training was supposed to last three to four months, but due to time constraints the Afghan forces were trained for about a month or so, thus creating uncertainty about the reliability for them to perform with U.S. structured conventional units. This left doubts among multiple commanders at different levels who all had a shared understanding of the mission of encircling and capturing Bin Laden and preventing him from executing their mission. In another article in the May-June 2002 edition of Military Review Transformation, Adam Geibel discusses the "misperception" of Afghan allied support when Commander Abdul Mateen Hassankheil massed approximately 1,500 fighters in the Shah-I-Kot Valley, criticizing "The United States does not understand our local politics; it doesn't know who to trust and it trusts the wrong people." CIA and Army planners were not receptive to other intelligence information and were misled about enemy numbers in the region and did not confirm the validity of the information they were receiving, nor was the information correct Checked This miscalculation in the Army's ability to properly plan and execute a mission failed because they did not grasp one of the principles of mission command. Another aspect of mission command principles is the shared understanding I talked about in the previous paragraph. Throughout the article it is shown that at all levels there was a Shared Understanding, an understanding of the mission set at a certain degree or level because not all commanders were in the Loop on all aspects of operations. The last time this type of confusion occurred was during the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, where Army Ranger units and Army conventional infantry units were not on the same page when it came to of secondary lines of action because the leaders did not consider it necessary. The commanders.