Nozick's argument against "distributive justice" Robert Nozick argues in his theory of rights that there are three main arguments in the justice of holdings: the acquisition of "things not owned,” the transfer of holdings, and the rectification of injustice in holdings.1 Nozick's theory of what makes a transfer of holdings “just” should be rejected for two fundamental reasons and the rectification of injustice in holdings holdings should be rejected for two fundamental reasons. Robert Nozick declares a transfer of interests only if the exchange is voluntary and if the interest being exchanged was originally acquired through fair means.2 The first key point of this argument that should be rejected is the fact that the grounds for a transfer " right" of holdings are based solely on whether or not the exchange was voluntary on both sides. With this low standard of justice, it allows for voluntary exchanges in which a party unknowingly, possibly due to circumstances he cannot control such as limited mental capacity, may voluntarily commit to a transfer of interests that will have an adverse effect on him, indirectly or directly. These people may voluntarily agree to a transfer of interests that they certainly would not agree to if they were of sound mind and could consider all the factors contributing to the transfer. There are these people who are not of sound mind or who do not have the mental capacity to keep their best interests in mind, and there are also people who would gladly take advantage of these people to further their own selfish agendas. If you wanted to make Nozick's argument about what makes a share transfer "fair", you would have to allow people to cheat people of lesser mental capacity out of what is rightfully theirs through... middle of paper... .and they make the entire exchange and acquisition process very slow and cumbersome. Unless there was a way to effectively track and record every transaction in a quick and streamlined way, rectifying holdings could effectively stop a market. Therefore, for the four reasons stated above, Robert Nozick's themes on the transfer of holdings and the rectification of holdings within his legal theory should be rejected. Not only are Nozick's propositions inefficient and immoral, but they can also create double standards about what constitutes an injustice. Works Cited1 Robert Nozick, “'Distributive Justice' from Anarchy, State and Utopia” in Tamar Szabó Gendler, Susanna Siegel, and Steven M. Cahn (eds.), The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 309—310.2Nozick, 309—310.3Nozick, 310.4Nozick, 311.