In “Freedom of the will and the concept of the person”, Harry Frankfurt illustrates the concepts of freedom of will and freedom of action, but above all, Frankfurt refined the theory of compatibilism. Compatibilism allows free will to exist in the deterministic world. According to the theory of determinism, the future state of worlds is determined by some events that occurred in the distant past (E) and the laws of nature (L). More specifically, E refers to history, such as experiences or states, while L refers to scientific or physical laws such as gravity. For example, the action of an alcoholic is determined by the fact that he will not stop drinking. Here E is that he had drunk in the past, and L is the physiological dependence effect caused by alcohol. Since we can control neither E nor L, it follows that we can never act freely. The compatibilist thesis, however, states that we could have free will, even if all our actions are determined by forces beyond our control. Frankfurt compatibilism provides a more refined model than Humean compatibilism. Humean compatibilism denied the deterministic notion of freedom, or the ability to choose otherwise. Hume then provides a new definition of freedom, as “a power to act or not to act, according to the determinations of the will” (“Of Liberty and Necessity,” 23). From Hume's view, as long as we act according to our desires and beliefs, we exercise freedom of will and freedom of action. Frankfurt adds a further distinction within our desires and concludes that our will is free if and only if we act on a first-order desire determined by our second-order desire. An agent's will, defined by Frankfurt, is “the notion of an actual desire that moves (or wants to or would like to move) a…populated…paper medium. Brainwashing is analogous to forces beyond our control. Frankfurt's theory is still valid, since it is not the origin of Sam's second-order desire. When he has free will, this implies that he acts freely in selling off his company. Indeed, Frankfurt seems to undermine the theory of determinism. If some external forces causally determine Sam's second-order desire, then Sam cannot have desired otherwise. That is, he cannot have two versions of second-order desire, neither of which allows him to have freedom of will or freedom of action. That is, Frankfurt theory leads to a completely different conclusion when Frankfurt compatibilism does not agree with determinism. Works Cited Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the will and the concept of the person”. Web.Hume, David. “Of freedom and necessity”. An investigation into the human intellect. Net.