Growing unease and suspicion between the world's two most powerful countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, characterized the Cold War. Much of this discomfort stemmed from the lack of transparency between the two powers. Neither side has ever been able to fully discern the other's foreign policy intentions. Yet even when the leaders of the two countries have met and been relatively candid with each other, this sense of unease has only grown. Each leader presented distinct arguments with unique underlying assumptions and implicit themes. The arguments and observations presented by John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev at the Vienna summit contributed to the growing bifurcation between the United States and the Soviet Union and contributed to Kennedy's concern about the spread of communism and that many would use Mao's suggestion Zedong that “power was at the end of a rifle” to justify this spread (6). To remedy this problem, Kennedy suggested that both powers should not directly engage in fighting in “other sectors” and should not subvert the “national interests” of the other power (5). Khrushchev believed that Kennedy's concern with this issue endangered Soviet national interests, since Soviet security ultimately depended on the success of ideas such as communism in countries along the Soviet periphery (including Germany). Furthermore, he argued that US interference had effectively subverted Soviet national interests and had also prevented domestic development in countries such as Iran and Cuba (10). Kennedy responded by altering the historical narrative presented by Khrushchev, stating that the United States had used the instrument of intervention judiciously since it had never intervened in Guinea or Mali, where the governments had been freely elected (11). The two countries disagreed on the effectiveness and necessity of intervention to maintain the global balance. The two countries reached an agreement only on the Laos issue thanks to Khrushchev's flexible attitude towards the situation in Southeast Asia (13). The fact that, despite pressing interests around the world, an agreement could only be reached on the Laos issue may have dashed some of the leaders' hopes for a period of relative détente. Both leaders also agreed that nuclear testing was an important issue to pursue (16). Kennedy feared nuclear tests because of the fallout material that could circulate in the wind around the world. Khrushchev was reluctant to establish a nuclear inspection regime that would enable the potential for espionage and limit his autonomy. After the Vienna summit, both powers will work to reconcile these differences and create an acceptable agreement (Leffler