Ever since Plato introduced the idea of ​​dualism thousands of years ago, metaphysicians have had to deal with the mind-body problem. Even so, Plato's idea of ​​dualism did not become a major issue of debate in the philosophical world until the 17th century, when the French philosopher René Descartes publicized his ideas regarding the mental and physical world. Throughout this article, I will analyze the question of individuation and identity in Descartes' philosophical vision of mind-body dualism. I will first begin by explaining the structure of Cartesian dualism. I will also analyze the challenges of individuation and identity as they interact with Descartes. With any luck, by subsequently analyzing Descartes' reasoning and subsequently offering my own response, I can present with a high degree of confidence that problems of individuation and identity offer an obstacle to the Cartesian principle of mind-body dualism. I will provide a critical analysis of these two problems, I will first explain the basis of Descartes' philosophical views. Surprisingly, dualism has become synonymous with René Descartes who is often defined by many simply as Cartesian dualism, as if this were the decisive line of attack on the issue. The theory behind dualism is that mind and body, that is, mind and matter, are two distinct things. Descartes reflected well on the difficulty of localizing the mind and came to the conclusion that the mind is an entity completely separate from the body. Descartes claimed to be a subject of conscious thought and experience and therefore cannot be anything other than spatially extended matter. The fundamental nature of the human being, i.e. the mind, cannot be material but is obliged not to be... middle of paper... mind. As with individuation, Strawson along with his fellow anti-Cartesians can accurately distinguish in the same way that I am able to accurately identify myself as the same person I was 5 years ago. According to Descartes' philosophy it is not possible to identify the same mind over time, and therefore it is not possible to speak "coherently" (as stated by Strawson) about the mind. Using Strawson's examination as a guide to Descartes' philosophy, I have attempted to show how the two questions of individuation and identity threaten to destroy Descartes' philosophy of mind-body dualism. I have been a firm believer in the anti-Cartesian argument that to unite a mind with a body the Cartesians and anti-Cartesians are considered vital principles by Strawson, so one must think of the mind as something dependent on someone, and not a completely separate entity, as Descartes would say.